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 It is said that the privatization of the Japanese National Railway is a success since the 
management, productivity, and service have improved. However, as expected, the gap 
of both management and productivity tends to widen between the larger main-island JRs 
and the smaller three-island JRs. This paper will estimate the cost structure of the six 
 JRs after the privatization. The main points we will make are as follows: first, the 
  economies of scale exist in both the incumbent railway service and the Shinkansen 
 service; second, there is no conclusive evidence to show that the economies of scope 
exist between them; third, the cost gap between the main-island JRs and the three-island 
        JRs is large; and fourth, the cost gaps within them are also large.
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Introduction
More than ten years have passed since the Japanese National Railway (JNR) was 
privatized and broken up. The privatization is in general evaluated as a success 
because the management, productivity, and service have improved following the birth of 
the Japan Railway (JR) group. However, a problem accompanying the privatization is 
the regional gap between the larger JRs operating on the main-island of Japan and the 
smaller JRs operating on three smaller islands. The railway industry has been 
considered to be one in which the economies of scale obviously exist. It is, therefore, 
a matter of concern that the large difference in the scale and density of market leads to 
the cost gap between the main-island JRs and the three-island JRs. Furthermore, the 
cost gap may be expanded further if the economies of scope exist, because only the 
main-island JRs are at present operating 'Shinkansen'.
The purposes of this paper are, first, to estimate the cost structure of the six passenger 
JRs, second, to perform the test of whether the economies of scale and scope exist or 
not, and, third, to compare the long-term marginal costs of the incumbent railway 
service and the Shinkansen service'. The main points we will make are as follows . 
1 Several studies have been made to test the economie
s of scope in the railway industry. For 
example, Kim (1987) dealt with the American railway industry while Preston (1996) studied the 
British railway industry. They found that the economies of scope did not exist between the 
passenger t ansportation service and the freight service. The originality of this paper lies in the fact 
that the economies of scope between the two passenger transportation services, the incumbent 
railway service and the Shinkansen service, will be tested. Tauchen, Fravel, and Gilbert (1983), 
Harmatuck (1991), Calburn and Talley (1992), Keeler and Formby (1994), for example, are also 
informative concerning other transportation services. 
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zFirst, the economies of scale exist in both the incumbent railway service and the 
Shinkansen service. Second, on the other hand, there is no conclusive vidence to 
show that the economies of scope exist between them. Third, as expected, the cost gap 
between the main-island JRs and the three-island JRs is large. Fourth, furthermore, the 
cost gaps within the main-island JRs and the three-island JRs are also large. The 
above results will provide an empirical foundation for the policy discussion in the 
Japanese railway industry, concerning such issues as the complete privatization of the 
main-island JRs, the subsidy mechanism for the three-island JRs, or the project to 
construct further Shinkansen railways. 
The paper consists of the following six sections. Section 2 briefly surveys the 
privatization and liberalization of the Japanese railway industry. Section 3 explains the 
method of a cost estimation and represents he result, while Section 4 carries out the test 
of the economies of scale and scope. Section 5 analyzes the different costs in each 
area, and Section 6 draws a conclusion. 
 An overview of the privatization of the Japanese National Railway 
It will be helpful to survey the privatization of the Japanese National Railway before 
moving on to the main subject. The explanation ofthis section owes much to Mizutani 
and Nakamura (2000) and Takeuchi (2000)2. 
2 Also see Fukui (1992), Fukui, et al., (1994), Mizutani (1997), Mizutani and Nakamura (1996, 
1997), Takeuchi, Imahashi, and Yamauchi (1997) for further details. 
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The Japanese railway service was inaugurated in 1872 and was basically nationalized in
1906. After the end of World War II, a public corporation called the Japanese National 
Railway (JNR) was established in 1949 and started to supply the affordable and 
available service in the public interest. It is in 1964 that two remarkable occurrences 
happened: the first is that JNR started the Shinkansen service, or bullet train service; the 
second is that JNR began incurring the operational deficits for the first time. The 
financial difficulties of JNR continued: the accumulated deficit finally reached 15.4 
trillion yen while the long-term liabilities became 25.5 trillion yen in 1986 just before 
the privatization. This is because of the very characteristic of public corporation as 
well as the intensified competition with automobiles and airplanes: fares could not be 
raised without approval by the Diet and the revision was always delayed. 
On 1 April 1987, JNR was privatized and divided into six regional passenger railway 
companies, which are now called the Japan Railway (JR) group. Three larger 
companies (JR East, JR Central, and JR West) are operating on the main-island of Japan 
whereas three smaller companies (JR Hokkaido, JR Shikoku, and JR Kyushu) are 
operating on three smaller islands (Hokkaido, Shikoku, and Kyushu). The Shinkansen 
service is operated only by the main-island JRs4. Figure 1 displays the operating areas 
of the six passenger JRs while Table 1 depicts the average outputs of the incumbent 
s Furthermore, we have to point out that other reason was the consciousness of 'Oyakata Hinomaru 
(Rising Sun as Patron)' of JNR, which means that he government (whose symbol isrising sun) 
would lastly take care of the company whatever the deficit would be. 
4 The. infrastructure was at first hold by the Shinkansen Holding Corporation by the vertical 
separation between the infrastructure andthe operation f Shinkansen. However, the assets were 
bought by the main-island JRs, and the Shinkansen Holding Corporation was dissolved in 1991. 
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6
railway service and the Shinkansen service since the privatization, which are 
represented by `passenger-km'. At the same time, one freight company (JR Freight) 
and the JNR Settlement Corporation were established: JR Freight uses the other six JRs' 
track and pays usage-fees to them; the JNR Settlement Corporation was set up in order 





At present, the Japanese privatization of JNR is regarded as a success. First, the JR 
group is now in the black and also operating other businesses, though JNR was 
prohibited from operating other businesses. Second, productivity has improved 
drastically, the largest factorr inwhich is thought to be the increase inlabor productivity. 
Third, service qualities such as frequency, travel time, speed and so on, have also 
improved. On the other hand, some problems of privatization have been pointed out. 
To begin with, the long-term debt has not significantly decreased, and it reached 27.6 
trillion yen in 19965. Nevertheless, the construction plan for further Shinkansen 
railways is still proposed to serve even low-demand areas such as Hokkaido, Tohoku, 
Hokuriku, and Kyushu, in part because politicians want the Shinkansen service for their 
constituencies6. Next, and more importantly for this paper, the regional gap of the 
S At first, most of long-term debt had been the responsibility of the JNR Settlement Corporation, but 
it was taken over by general account and the JNR Settlement Corporation was dissolved in 1998. 
6 In many cases, unprofitable incumbent railway services are abolished instead of the construction of 
Shinkansen, or a quasi-public sector, such as a joint venture of local governments and private 
companies, is established to take over the business. 
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Japanese passenger railway service has seemed to widen. It was truly expected at the 
time of privatization that the main-island JRs would have advantages and the three-
island JRs would be suffering from the managerial problems because their sizes and 
population densities were quite different. A lump-sum subsidy scheme by the 
Management Stability Fund was established to solve the problem of regional gap. The 
three-island JRs have been subsidized by the interest revenue of the Fund, but the 
amount of subsidy tends to decrease because of Japan's low interest rate policy in the 
1990s7.
The estimation of cost function
This section will explain the estimation model of cost function. JR East, JR Central, 
and, JR West are operating Shinkansen, whereas JR Hokkaido, JR Shikoku, and JR 
Kyushu are not. Accordingly, we will estimate them, separately assuming two-output 
model for the main-island JRs and one-output model for the three-island JRs8. 
The estimation of the two-output model of the main-island JRs 
' Originally
, there used to be no fare differences within the JR group because it imposed a uniform 
tariff policy. However, due to the decrease in interest revenue from the Fund, only the three-island 
JRs decided to increase fares by 6-7% in 1996. 
' The reason for the separate stimation is that the th
ree-island JRs do not run the Shinkansen service 
but translog cost function does not admit zero value. One possible method is to adopt the 
generalized translog cost function that carries out Box-Cox transformation. Box-Cox 
transformation defines output as Y,. = (Ye -1) l8, which becomes linear in the case of 0=1 and 
logarithmic in the case of 0=0. At first, we tried to perform the Box-Cox transformation with the 
pooled data of the six JRs. However, we abandoned this approach because the value of 0 did not 
converge and the model was not proper in this point. 
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This section will explain the estimation model of the main-island Ms. We assume here 
a cost function that consists of three inputs of labor force, material, and capital and two 
outputs of incumbent railway and Shinkansen as follows: 
       C= C (L, M, K, Y1, Y2), (1) 
             given L--labor, M= material, K=capital, 
             Y1=the incumbent railway service, and Y2=the Shinkansen service. 
Furthermore, we suppose the cost function to be a translog cost function, which is 
known as a type of flexible cost function. 
     lnC=ao+ a,Inf+1 l3Y1nP1nPJ+ yklnYk                 i-~K 2 f- K- K                              > k=T 2 
       + 1 6kl InYk lnY1 + Pik In P, InYk +Q2D1nY2        2I2 i-~Kk;-2 
Three inputs prices are defined as follows': 
      PL: the labor price = the real personnel expenses / the number of employees at 
            the end of the fiscal year, 
      PM: the material price = the real non-personnel expenses / the number of 
             vehicle-km, 
     PK: the capital price = the price index of the capital goods x (the interest rate of 
             the government guaranteed bonds + the rate of depreciation), 
      given the rate of depreciation = the depreciation expenses / the equipment 
            expenses at the beginning of the fiscal year. 
9 See Monthly Price Index Report by Bank of Japan about he price index of the capital goods and 
Monthly Economic Statistics Report by Bank of Japan about he interest rate of the government 
guaranteed bonds. 
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Also two outputs are defined as follows: 
     Y1: the incumbent railway service (passenger-km), 
     Y2: the Shinkansen service (passenger-km).
Since Shinkansen of JR Central connects the three metropolises of Tokyo, Nagoya and 
Osaka, the scale of market is extremely large. Accordingly, we adopt the dummy 
variable (D=1) for the output of Shinkansen of JR Central. Furthermore, we assume 
the following constraints of linear homogeneity with regard to input prices in advance: 
           a, =1, i~ Nij = pjk = 0 . (3)                            K j- K 
At the same time, we assume the following symmetry of second-order partial 
derivatives with regard to input prices: 
                                        (4) 
From Shepherd's lemma, the share equations of inputs (i=L,M,K) are obtained as 
follows: 
      alnC aCP _P X,                         =a,+ /. In Pj + pk In Yk . (5)         ain P aP C C 
i- ,K k`_T,,2
The total cost that is the explained variable is the sum of the real personnel expenses, 
the real material cost, and the real capital cost. The capital cost is defined as the 
product of the capital stock and the capital price, and the capital stock is defined as 
follows: 
     the capital stock = (1- the rate of depreciation) x the capital stock at the previous 
             term + the real gross investment, 




             assets + the depreciation expenses. 
We can now estimate the simultaneous equations of the translog cost function, with the 
constraints of the linear homogeneity and the second-order symmetry, and the share 
equations of labor and material by the maximum likelihood (ML) method" 
The estimation of the one-output model of the three-island JRs 
This section will explain the estimation model of the three-island JRs. We assume here 
a cost function that consists of three inputs of labor force, material, and capital and one 
output of the incumbent railway service as follows: 
       C= C(L, M, K, Y1). (6) 
             given L=labor, M= material, K=capital, 
             and Y1= the incumbent railway service. 
The cost function to be estimated is given as follows: 
     lnC = ao + 2a i lnPi + 1 E I ij 1nPi InPj 
                       i-L,M,K 2 i-L,M,Kj-L,M,K (7) 
           + ylnY + lb lnY2 + pi lnPln + cD 
                                    2 i-L,M,K 
The operating area of JR Shikoku is very small compared to those of JR Hokkaido and 
JR Kyushu, and the railway network has not been sufficiently developed. Accordingly, 
we adopt the dummy variable (D=1) for the constant term of JR Shikoku. From 
Shepherd's lemma, the share equations of inputs (i=L,M,K) are obtained as follows: 
10 Since the sum of three share quations must be one
, one of them can be dropped. 
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       a In C aC P P,. x' -a , (8)                          +
a f ' In P + p In Yj .         aIn P,. aP C _ C j , K 
We can now estimate the simultaneous equations in the same way as the previous 
section's by the maximum likelihood (ML) method. 
The results of the estimations 
This section will show the results of the estimations. Tables 2 and 3 display the results 
of the estimations of the cost functions of the main-island JRs and the three-island JRs 
respectively. The standard errors are parenthetically represented, and the results are 
quite good. 
      < Tables 2 and 3> 
          The test of the economies of scale and scope 
This section will move on to verify the economies of scale and scope, based on the 
results of the estimations. 
The definitions of the economies of scale and scope 
First, the product specific economies of scale are originally defined as follows: 
     [ aC(Y1, Y2)/ aYl] x [Y1 / (C(Y1, Y2) - C(0, Y2))] 
     [ 9C(Y1, Y2)/ dY2] x [Y2 / (C(Y1, Y2) - C(Y1, 0))]. (9) 
If these figures are lower (higher) than 1, the product-specific economies 
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r(diseconomies) of scale exist. However, as previously stated in this paper, since the 
translog functional form does not admit C(0, Y2) and C(Y1, 0), the economies of scale 
cannot be verified directly". At this moment, the following indices shall be used: 
     SCALE(Y) m alnC(Y1, Y2)/ alnY1 
     SCALE(Y) m alnC(Y1, Y2)/ alnY 2 . (10) 
In the cases of S CALE(Y 1)< 1(> 1) and SCALE(Y2)<l(>1), it can be said that the 
product-specific economies (diseconomies) of scale exist12. 
Second, the economies of scope are originally defined as follows: 
      [C(Y1, 0)+ C(0, Y2)-C(Y1, Y2)]/ C(Y1, Y2) . (11) 
If this figure is positive (negative), the economies (diseconomies) of scope exist. 
However, since the translog functional form does not admit C(0, Y2) and C(Y1, 0), the 
economies of scope cannot be verified directly. At this moment, the following index, 
which is called the weak complementarities of cost, shall be used: 
     SCOPE E a2C(Y1,Y2)/( aY1 9Y2). (12) 
In the case of SCOPE<0(>0), the weak complementarities of cost exist (do not exist). 
This nature of cost is a sufficient condition for the existence of the economies of scope. 
The result of the test of the economies of scale and scope 
To begin with, we will investigate the economies of scale of the main-island JRs.
11 See Baumol, Panzar and Willig (1982) concerning the further discussions of economies of scale 
and scope. 
12 Note alnC(Y
1, Y2)/ 81nYk =[ aC(Y1, Y2)/ aYk] x [Yk /C(Y1, Y2)]. 
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Table 4 shows the result of the test. First, the economies of scale exist in the 
incumbent railway service in that SCALE(Y1)<1 holds for JR East and JR West after the 
privatization". Second, the economies of scale exist in the Shinkansen service because 
SCALE(Y2)<l holds for all JR East, JR Central, and JR West after the privatization. 
The result of the test is reliable because the entire estimates are statistically significant 
at the 5% level. It can be concluded from what has been stated that the main-island 
JRs have the economies of scale in both the incumbent railway service and the 
Shinkansen service.
I
     <Table 4> 
Next, we will investigate he economies of scope of the main-island JRs, as shown in 
Table 4. The economies of scope appear to exist in that SCOPE<0 ' holds for JR East 
and JR West after the privatization. However, these figures are quite small in 
comparison with these standard errors. At this moment, we shall carry out Wald test 
concerning the null hypotheses that the given set of parameters i  jointly zero. It 
follows that the values of x2 are 0.357 (the p-value is 0.550) and 1.302 (the p-value is 
0.254) respectively, and therefore we cannot reject he null hypotheses. To sum up, we 
do not have conclusive vidence to show that JR East and JR West have the economies 
of scope. On the other hand, the negative figure of SCOPE of JR Central is large, and 
the value of x 2 is 12.813 (the p-value is 0.000). We can safely say that JR Central has 
13 The value of JR Central isnegative b cause the monotonicity ondition with regard to the output 
of the incumbent railway service is not satisfied. This is probably because the output of the 
incumbent railway service of JR Central isso small that he estimated model is not proper around 
this area. However, it should be noted that such an anomaly is not observed in other samples. 
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the economies of scope. The question of why only JR Central has the economies of 
scope will arise. The possible reason is that JR Central is a special company which is 
operating a very large part of the Shinkansen service but which is operating a small part 
of the incumbent railway service, and it has not been able to make good use of the scope 
economies. In conclusion, the main-island JRs except for JR Central cannot be said to 




Finally, we will refer to the economies of scale of the three-island JRs. Table 5 shows 
the result of the test. The economies of scale exist in the incumbent railway service in 
that SCALE(Y1)<1 holds for JR Hokkaido, JR Shikoku, and JR Kyushu after the 
privatization. The result of the test is reliable because the entire estimates are 
statistically significant at the 5% level.
< Table 5>
To sum up, on one hand, there are the economies of scale in both the incumbent railway 
service and the Shinkansen service, which presumably leads to the different costs in 
each region. On the other hand, since there is no conclusive proof to show that the 
economies of scope,exist, we cannot be absolutely certain that the additional provision 
of the Shinkansen service would decrease the cost for providing the incumbent railway 
service.
The regional gap of cost between the six As
-13-
In this section, based on the results of the estimation, the long-term marginal costs of 
each output, dC(L, M, K, Y1, Y2)/ LYi, will be calculated to compare the six JRs. First, 
the upper row of Table 6 shows the long-term marginal costs of the incumbent railway 
service of five JRs, excluding JR Central, in which the reliable estimate cannot be 
obtained. The marginal costs of the incumbent railway service of JR East and JR West, 
which own Shinkansen, are both about 6 yen. On the other hand, those of JR 
Hokkaido, JR Shikoku and JR Kyushu, which do not own Shinkansen, are considerably 
different. The marginal cost of JR Shikoku is very high (about 11 yen) while that of 
JR Kyushu is very low (about 5 yen, which is in fact lower than the figures of JR East 
and JR West). At any rate, we can see that there is a large regional gap in the 
incumbent service because of the different scales between the six JRs at the time of 
privatization. However, it will be noteworthy that JR East, which is by far and away 
the largest company in the incumbent service, is not necessarily operating at the least 
cost level. One reason for this is that JR East has to cover the low-demand areas such 
as Tohoku and Hokuriku as well as the Tokyo metropolitan area. Another reason is 
probably that the economies of scope are not strong when the incumbent railway and 
the Shinkansen services are compared. In addition, our new observation is that the 
cost gap is large within the three-island JRs. This means that we cannot discuss their 
management problems in the same way because they are so different.
Next, the lower row of Table 6 shows the long-term marginal costs of the Shinkansen 
service of the main-island JRs. Although the marginal costs of the Shinkansen service 
of JR East and JR West are similar, about 16 yen and 14 yen respectively, it is 
interesting to note that JR West, which owns the higher-demand Sanyo-Shinkansen, is
-14-
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operating at the lower cost level than JR East, which owns the lower-demand Tohoku, 
Joetsu, and Nagano Shinkansen. More noteworthy is the fact that the marginal cost of 
the Shinkansen service of JR Central, which connects the three metropolises of Tokyo, 
Nagoya, and Osaka, is very low (about 9 yen), as compared with those of JR East and 
JR West. This means that there is a large cost gap of the Shinkansen service between 
high-demand and low-demand areas so that we cannot make a valid comparison of the 
management problems of the Shinkansen service across different areas. Although it is 
now planned to construct further Shinkansen lines even in the low-demand areas, it is a 
matter of concern that there will be financial difficulties.
                       Conclusion 
This paper has examined the cost structure of the six passenger JRs after the 
privatization. As a result, we have found that the economies of scale exist while the 
economies of scope do not always exist. Furthermore, as expected, there are regional 
gaps not only between the main-island and the three-island JRs but also within them. 
Thus, we have empirically observed the regional gap of the JR group after the 
privatization.. Some problems have been left unanswered. First, this paper focused 
on the aspect of , cost structure. We need to take account of the aspect of demand and 
revenue. Furthermore, we should consider the competition of the JR group against 
other railway companies. Finally, the competition between railway, motorcar, and 
airplane must be taken into consideration. We are fully aware of the questions stated 
above and consider them to be subjects for future research.
-15-
References
Baumol, W.J., J.C. Panzar, and R.D. Willig (1982): Contestable Markets and the Theory 
       of Industrial Structure, Harcourt Brace and Jovanovich. 
Calburn, C. and W. Talley (1992): "A Firm Specific Analysis of Economies of Size in 
       the U.S. Urban Multiservice Transit Industry." Transportation Research B 26B, 
      195-206. 
Fukui, K. (1992): "Japanese National Railways Privatization Study: Japanese 
       Experience and Lessons for Developing Countries." World Bank Discussion 
       Paper, No. 172, The World Bank, Washington, D.C., USA. 
Fukui, K., K. Nakamura, T. Ozaki, H. Sakamaki, and F. Mizutani (1994): "Japanese 
      National Railways Privatization Study II," CFC Discussion Paper, No. 107, 
      The World Bank, Washington, D.C., USA. 
Harmatuck, D. (1991): "Economies of Scale and Scope in the Mortar Carrier Industry." 
      Journal of Transport Economics and Policy, 25, 135-151. 
Keeler, J.P. and J.P. Formby (1994): "Cost 'Economies and Consolidation in the U.S. 
       Airline Industry." International Journal of Transport Economics, 21, 21-45. 
Kim, H.Y. (1987): "Economies of Scale and Scope in Multiproduct Firms: Evidence 
      from US Railroads." Applied Economics, 19,733-741. 
Mizutani, F. (1997): "Empirical Analysis of Yardstick Competition in the Japanese 
       Railway Industry." International Journal of Transport Economics, 24.3, 367-
      392.. 
Mizutani, F. and K. Nakamura (1996): "Effect of Japan National Railways' 









 F. and K. Nakamura (1997): "Privatization of the Japan National Railway: 
Overview of Performance Changes." International Journal of Transport 
Economics, 24.1, 75-99. 
, F. and K. Nakamura (2000): "Japan Railways since Privatization." in: B. 
Bradshaw and H.L. Smith (Eds.), Privatization and Deregulation of Transport,
      Macmillan Press LTD. 
Preston, J. (1996): "The. Economics of British Rail Privatization: An Assessment." 
       Transport Reviews, 16.1, 1-21. 
Takeuchi, K., R. Imahashi, and H. Yamauchi (1997): "Privatization of Japan National 
      Railway." Osaka University Discussion Paper, Faculty of Economics and 
      Osaka School of International Public Policy, 97-05. 
Takeuchi, K. (2000): "Transport Industries: Railway Transportation." in: Y. Toyama, et 
      al. (Eds.), Public Utility Industries in Japan, Michigan State University Papers. 
Tauchen, H., F. Fravel, and G. Gilbert (1983): "Cost Structure in the Intercity Bus 
       Industry." Journal of Transport Economics and Policy, 17, 25-47.
-17-
??
?
?
?
一18一
?
?
?
?
?
??
?
?
??
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
ー
?
ー
?
?
?
?
??
??
?
?
??
?
?
ー
????
?
?
?
?
?
??
?
??
?
?
?
?
?
??
?
?
?
?
?
??
?
?
?
?
?
??
??
?
?
?
??
』
?
?
??
?
??
?。
?
。〉
?
??
】
??
?
?
??
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?、
??
??
?
?
??
?』
?
?
?
』?
?
?
?
??
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
??
??
↑
一19
?〉
?
?
?
??
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
??
?
?
、
?〉
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
??
??
?
???
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
??
?
?
?
?
?
。。?
。?
。。
?
?
。?
。。??
?
?
?
?
?。
?
???
?
?
?
?
?
???
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
???
?
??
?
??
?
?
??
?
』?
?
?
?』
?
?
?
?
?
??
??
??
??
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
???
?
??
??
?
?
?
?
?
??
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
???
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
??
?
?
?
??
?
?
??
??
?
?
?
??
?
』
?
?
?』
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
??
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
??
?
???
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
??
??
??
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
??
?
?
?
』?
??
??
?
?
?
??
?
?「
?
?
?
?
?
?
??
一20
??
?
?
?
?
??
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
↓?
、
?
??
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
??
???
?
?
??
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?【
?
??
?
??
??
?
?
?
?
?
?
㌧?
?』
?
?、
?
?
??
』?
?
』?
』?
?
??
??
、
?
?
?
?
?』
?
?
?
?
?』
??
?
?
??
?
??
?
?
?
?
?
?
??
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
??
?
?
?
?
??
?
』?
?
?
??
?
?
??
、
?
?
?
?
??
?
?
???
?
?
??
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
????
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
??
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
??
?
?
↓↑
?
?
?
?
?
」?
??
?
?
?
?
?、
?
????
?
??
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
??
???
?
?
?
?
?
??
?
?
?
?
????
?
?
?
??
?
?
?
?
?
』
?
?
?
?
?
?
?』
?
』
?
?【?
??
?
?』
?
?
??
?
?
』「
一21一
、
?
?
?
?
??
??
?
?
?
?
?
?
??
?
?。??
?。?
?
??
?
??
?
?
?
?
?
?
???
?
?
??
。?
↓?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
???
?
?
???
』?
?
?
?』
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
??
?
?
?
?
??
????
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
???
?
?
?
?
?
????
?
?
?
』?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
??
?
????
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
???
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?ー
?
?
?
?
』
?
?
?
??
?
?
??
??
?
?
?
?
?
?
』
?
??
』
?
?
?
?
?
。?
?
?
?
??
?
?
?
?
?
。。?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
??
??
??
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
??
?
??
?
?
』
?
。??
?
?
?
?
?
』
?
?
?
?
↑
?
」
」
㌔
〜
?
?㌔
?
一22一
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
??
??
?
?
??
?
?
?
??
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
??
?
?
?
?
?
??
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
』?
?
?』
?
?
?
?
?
??
??
?
?
?
?
??
?
?
??
?
?
?
??
?』
?
??
』?
?
?
??
?
。?
??
?
?
?
?
?
?
??。
?】
??
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
??
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
??
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
??
??
一23一
??』
?
?
。?
?、
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
ー
?
?
??
?
?
??
??
?
???
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
??
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
??
』?
??
?』
?
?
?
?
?
??
?。?
?】
?
?
?
?
??
?
?
?
?
?
?
??
?
?
?
?
?。
??
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?』
??
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
??
?
?
?
0
誘
?
?
??
」
?
?
?
?
?
???
?
?
?
、
?
郷
??
??
??
?
?
?
??
?
??
?
?
??
?
???
?
?
?
』??
?
。
?
??
?
??
?
??
??
?
?
?
???
?
?
?
?
?
??
』
??
?
?
?
?
』??
?
?
?
?
?
??
?
?
?
???
?
?
???
???
一24一
??
?
』
?
??
?
???
?
?
?
??
』?
?
?
??
?
』
